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The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the monopolistic US local telephone industry to
new entrants. However, substantial entry costs have prevented some markets from becoming
competitive.We study various subsidy policies designed to encourage entry.We estimate a dynamic
entry game using data on potential and actual entrants, allowing for heterogeneous option values
of waiting. We find that subsidies to smaller markets are more cost effective in reducing monopoly
markets, but subsidies to only lower-cost firms are less cost effective than a nondiscriminatory
policy. Subsidies in only early periods reduce the option value of waiting and accelerate the
arrival of competition.
1. Introduction
 Many telecommunication services have been deregulated in the last few decades, including
the US local telephone industry. Before deregulation, services were provided by regulated mo-
nopolists, competitive entry was forbidden, and prices were set by federal and state authorities
according to cost-plus, rate-of-return regulation guidelines (Hausman and Taylor, 2012). After
deregulation, the markets were opened to competition and many of the pricing regulations were
phased out. Consequently, on the one hand, smaller, competitive telecommunications compa-
nies were allowed to enter, even using the incumbents’ unbundled network and facilities; on the
other hand, incumbents enjoyed newfound freedom and greater market power if new entrants
did not arrive. Given the substantial cost of entry in the telecommunications industry, ensuring a
competitive market structure after deregulation is an ongoing concern for policy makers.
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In general, entry costs can hinder competition in a deregulated market. When the costs of
entry are high enough, deregulation itself may not be sufficient to attract entry. Themonopolymar-
ket structure from before the deregulation might remain, only now the incumbent is unregulated
and may exploit its market power. To address this issue, one policy remedy could be to subsidize
new firms’ entry costs. Such subsidy policies have been adopted in many industries.1 This opens
up the question of how to design such subsidies as a function of the economic environment. For
instance, different potential entrants may face different levels of entry costs. Also, markets differ
in size, which affects post entry profit. How important is it to consider such firm heterogeneity
and market heterogeneity in the design of the subsidy policy? In addition, although a subsidy
lowers a firm’s entry cost today, it also changes this firm’s belief about the future competition
level in the market it considers entering. How important is this competition effect for the design
of a subsidy policy?
In this article, we address the above questions by estimating a dynamic oligopoly game of
entry into the US local telephone industry. Prior to 1996, local markets were served by regulated
monopolists, the so-called Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs), who were mostly Baby
Bell companies. After the 1996 Telecommunications Act (henceforth, the Act), the markets were
opened to new entrants, referred to as Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs). In this
study, we focus on facilities-based CLECs, which build their own fiber-optic networks and digital
switches2 and are deemed by industry experts to represent true competition to ILECs (Crandell,
2001, 2005; Economides, 1999).3
We use a comprehensive panel data set, which records all facilities-based CLECs’ entry
decisions into local telephone markets between 1998 and 2002. With this data set, we observe
the identity of CLECs providing local telephone services to each local market each year. We also
observe the set of CLECs with certification to enter in each state each year. In this industry, a
CLEC needs to obtain certification from a state to operate in a market within the state. After
receiving state certification, a CLEC may wait years to actually enter. Based on this industry
feature, we define potential entrants into a local market as CLECs with certification from the
respective state. With information on the identity of potential and actual entrants, we are able
to observe how long a potential entrant waits to enter a market and several crucial firm-level
attributes associated with the cost of entry.
We set up a dynamic oligopoly game and incorporate the timing of entry and firm hetero-
geneity in the game. In our model, a potential entrant is a long-run player that decides whether
to enter or wait in each period. When making this decision, the potential entrant compares the
value of entry, minus entry costs, to the value of waiting. This is in contrast to most other en-
try studies, in which a firm either enters or perishes and the value of waiting is set to zero.4
Moreover, we allow potential entrants to be heterogeneous in entry costs. For example, a more
experienced potential entrant may face lower entry costs. To estimate our model, we follow the
recent development in two-step estimation strategies for dynamic oligopoly entry games. That is,
we first obtain the conditional choice probabilities at each state from the data. We then match the
empirical conditional choice probability with its counterpart predicted by the model.
The estimation of the model gives results that are consistent with basic economic intuition.
For instance, we find that a CLEC’s post entry profit is decreasing in competition and increasing
1 This practice is especially common in service industries, where the service is considered “essential for the basic
well-being of consumers.” For example, from 1978 to the present day, federal government programs have subsidized entry
of dentists, physicians, and mental health specialists into geographic areas designated as Health Professional Shortage
Areas (Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu, 2013).
2 Facilities-basedCLECs also lease some networks from ILECs to locations not served by theCLECs’ own networks;
and, more importantly, they need to interconnect with ILECs’ networks to exchange voice and data traffic.
3 CLECs that resell ILECs’ service or CLECs that rent ILECs’ networks and provide value-added services only
yield thin profit margins. They are considered as unsustainable (Crandall, 2001).
4 One exception is Fan (2006), who makes the distinction between a short-run and long-run player in a dynamic
entry game.
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in market size, as measured by the overall number of business establishments in a market. This
finding is in line with the conventional wisdom that a larger market is necessary to support
more competitors (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). In addition, we find that entry costs play
an important role in determining whether a potential entrant enters a local market. Overall, the
estimated model fits the data rather well—the predicted numbers of monopoly, duopoly, triopoly,
and more competitive markets are similar to those observed in the data.
With the estimated model parameters, we then study various subsidy policies designed to
encourage entry into monopolistic markets. We compare subsidy policies that would cost the
same in terms of the total subsidy spent and examine which policy leads to fewer monopoly
markets. Through counterfactual analyses, we find that a subsidy amounting to 5% of the average
entry cost reduces the fraction of monopoly markets to 32% by the end of 1998 (compared to 52%
in the data), and to 7% by the end of 2001 (compared to 23% in the data). Doubling such a subsidy
would reduce this fraction to 14% by the end of 1998 and to 1% by the end of 2001. However,
we also show that such subsidies can be more effective at reducing monopolies if offered only in
smaller markets. Although applied to small markets only, such a subsidy policy in general also
leads to a reduction in the number of customers stuck with monopoly markets, as measured by
the sum of market size over all monopoly markets. This suggests that subsidy policies should
exploit market heterogeneity. A subsidy policy that exploits firm heterogeneity in entry costs,
however, is not as effective at reducing monopoly markets as a nondiscriminatory policy. This
is because of the following trade-off: a subsidy to low-cost firms is more conducive to entry than
the same subsidy per firm to high-cost firms; however, by applying to fewer potential entrants,
it may also lead to less overall entry. According to our estimation, the latter effect dominates the
former.
More importantly, we quantify the influence of the option value of waiting on how quickly
a market becomes competitive. We find that subsidies intended to reduce the option value of
waiting, as expected, change the timing of firms’ entry behavior. Specifically, a 10% subsidy
that is offered only in 1998 reduces the number of monopoly markets to 9% by the end of
1998, as opposed to 14% when such a subsidy is applied in all years. This is because of a direct
effect of changing the timing of the subsidy and an indirect competition effect that potential
entrants anticipate less entry in the future due to the lack of the subsidy in the future. The direct
effect reduces the option value of waiting, whereas the indirect competition effect increases
the expected value of entry. Further investigation through decomposition exercises indicates
that both effects contribute to the overall results, but the indirect competition effect is slightly
larger.
Our counterfactual exercises focus on the reduction of monopolistic local markets. We do
not conduct a full welfare analysis in this article. Measuring welfare would require detailed data
describing demand. To the best of our knowledge, the data that would allow us to estimate the
demand for local telephone services is not available at the national level. Although we are unable
to gauge the total welfare gain of the counterfactual subsidies, previous work in the literature has
demonstrated a substantial gain associated with increased competition. Increased competitiveness
of a market typically leads to lower prices (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Nevo, 2000; Basker,
2005) and even better quality or wider variety (e.g., Mazzeo, 2003; Economides, Seim, and Viard,
2008; Matsa, 2011; Fan, 2013).
This article contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it is related to the literature
on dynamic entry game estimation. Several studies have made significant progress in this area
since Hotz andMiller (1993) proposed a two-step estimation strategy that does not require solving
for equilibrium in a complex dynamic model (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard,
and Levin, 2007; Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry, 2007; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2008).
Nonetheless, due to lack of data, there are some limitations to applications utilizing this approach
(Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu, 2013). For example,
researchers are usually unable to observe the identities of potential entrants and therefore have to
assume that potential entrants are ex ante homogeneous, short-run players. The players in these
C© The RAND Corporation 2015.
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dynamic games face the short-run decision of either entering or perishing.5 In most industries,
however, the decision that a potential entrant faces is to enter or to wait. By identifying potential
entrants for amarket, we are able to incorporate more information from entry timing of these firms
to recover the distribution of entry costs. Specifically, the players in our game face a long-run
decision of entering or waiting. We allow them to take into account the option value of delaying
their entry.6 When we compare our model to a model where the identity of potential entrants
is ignored, we find that our model fits the data better and, more importantly, generates different
effects of counterfactual subsidies.
This article is also related to the literature on competition in the local telephone markets.
Within this body of literature, Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) study CLEC entry decisions into
differentiated categories using a static entry model. In another study, Economides, Seim, and
Viard (2008) measure the consumer welfare effects of the increase in local telephone competition
after the Act, using household-level data from New York state. Finally, Goldfarb and Xiao (2011)
emphasize the importance of heterogeneity in managerial ability, which they back out from
entry behavior.7 Our article complements these studies by emphasizing the importance of market
heterogeneity and the competition effect of entry in the design of subsidy policies.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides relevant background information on
the US telephone market. Section 3 introduces our data set. Sections 4 and 5 describe in detail
our model and estimation strategy, respectively. Section 6 reports our estimation results, and
Section 7 presents the results from our counterfactual experiments. Section 8 concludes.
2. Industry background
 Access to telephone service is widely recognized as a fundamental part of public infras-
tructure. Increased access to telecommunication services creates positive network externalities
for individual consumers and enhances democratic participation and public safety. Equal access
to such infrastructure has been considered by regulators as essential in narrowing socioeconomic
gaps across different regions.
The Act marked the end of a long, monopolistic era in the US local telephone industry. Be-
fore the Act, ILECs enjoyed regulated monopoly power for decades on the grounds of substantial
economies of scale. Since the 1990s, however, dramatic reduction in the cost of fiber-optic tech-
nology has made competitive entry possible. The Act’s primary goal was to promote competitive
entry. Specifically, Section 253(a) of the Act eliminates a state’s authority to erect legal entry
barriers in local-exchange markets. More importantly, Section 2.1 mandates that ILECs must
offer interconnections and lease part or all of their network facilities to any new entrant at “rates,
terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”8
 Local telephone industry after the act. After the Act, ILECs remained major players
in the local telephone industry, but CLECs started to erode the ILECs’ market power in some
local markets. These CLECs come from various backgrounds. Some CLECs are ILECs in other
markets (e.g., CTC Exchange Services, an ILEC with a history of over 100 years, started a CLEC
division in 2000), some are long-distance carriers trying to enter the local exchange market (e.g.,
AT&T obtained certification from every US state right after the Act), and others are de novo
5 For example, Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) make this assumption explicit: “They (potential entrants) are
short lived and base their entry decisions on the net present value of entering today; potential entrants do not take the
option value of delaying entry into account.”
6 On this front, our article is connected to the literature on investment and uncertainty. A key insight of this literature
is that there is a value of delaying the investment in the presence of investment irreversibility and uncertainty about the
future (see Pindyck, 1991, for an overview, and Kellogg, 2014, for a recent empirical study).
7 Other studies of the US local telephone industry include Ackerberg et al. (2009), Alexander and Feinberg (2004),
Mini (2001), and Miravete (2002).
8 Economides (1999) provides an overview of the Act and its impact on the U.S. telecommunications industry.
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entrants catering to a targeted clientele (e.g., PaeTec Communications, founded in 1998, targeted
medium- and large-size businesses, government entities, and universities). These CLECs differ
substantially in ownership structure, financial resources, and experiences in the local telephone
markets.
The pace of new entry after the Act was slower than what policy makers had anticipated
back in 1996 (Economides, 1999; Young, Dreazen, and Blumenstein, 2002). Although around
40% of medium-size markets experienced entry by the end of 1998, about 30% of these markets
did not have any CLEC operating, even by the end of 2002. One factor presumably contributing
to low entry levels is the substantial cost of entry.
 Costs of entry. Facilities-based CLECs must make substantial investments in building
facilities such as switching and distribution centers, as well as laying out fiber-optic networks
physically connecting these switching and distribution centers to the end users of telephone
services. In our data, we observe annual capital expenditures for the majority of the CLECs.
Dividing a CLEC’s capital expenditure for a given year by the number of cities it entered next
year, we get a rough measure of its entry costs per market, which amounts to $6.5 million per
market on average. Furthermore, much of the investment has to be made at specific locations, so
these assets are not movable (Economides, 1999).
In addition, there are “soft” entry costs (Pindyck, 2005). For example, the costs consumers
face in switching from an incumbent to a new entrant, which are especially important in telecom-
munication industries, may create disadvantages for new entrants. To overcome these disadvan-
tages, new entrants may need to incur substantial advertising costs. Motivated by these facts, we
focus on the role of entry costs in shaping CLECs’ entry decisions. A measure of total entry costs
does not exist in accounting books. However, firms’ strategic entry decisions reflect the size and
distribution of such costs. We can back them out by combining a model of strategic entry with
data on actual entry behavior. With our estimates of entry costs, we can evaluate the effects of
different subsidy policies that directly reduce the costs of entry.
 State certification. To identify the set of potential entrants in a local market, we make use
of the requirement that CLECs must first obtain certification from state regulators before they can
operate in any city within the state. To obtain state certification, a CLEC applicant needs to submit
paperwork outlining the services to be offered, detailed construction plans, and an environmental
impact statement. Furthermore, the applicant needs to show a certain degree of financial ability
to serve. Some states require an applicant to show possession of a certain amount of cash or cash
equivalent at the time of the application, whereas others use more complex formulas.9 Overall,
the consensus in the industry is that obtaining state certification is a time-consuming process, and
only those with certification are likely to enter in a given year. Any CLEC without a real intent to
enter any market in a state will likely not apply for certification. This consensus is also consistent
with the data. As we will show in the next section, the average number of state certifications
that a CLEC holds is around 10 rather than all 50 states. The rather low number of states thus
suggests that the certification process is sufficiently time consuming that only firms with real
entry intentions will pursue state certification. On the other hand, the data also show that firms on
average wait more than two years from the time of certification to enter a local market, whereas
some CLECs never enter any city in a state for which they are approved to enter during the years
covered in this study (1998–2002). These data patterns indicate that firms do not wait until they
are certain about entry to get state certification. Thus, we identify potential entrants in a local
market as the set of CLECs with certification to operate in that state.10
9 Texas, for example, requires an applicant to show that (i) it has either $100,000 in cash or sufficient cash for
startup expenses for the first two years of operation or (ii) it is an established business entity and has shown a profit for
two years preceding the application date (Kennedy, 2001).
10 Although many states give CLEC applicants authority to serve the entire state, a few states require applicants to
specify each local area to be served. We deal with this potential caveat by dropping small cities – those with fewer than
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In summary, for each local market, a CLEC can take on one of four (mutually-exclusive)
roles: a CLEC without state certification is a “potential” potential entrant, a CLEC with state
certification becomes a potential entrant, a CLEC in its first year of providing services is a new
entrant, and a CLEC providing services from its second year and on is an incumbent.
3. Data
 To obtain our data set, we combine data on CLECs and data on markets to create a panel
data set of firms’ entry decisions, firm-level characteristics, and market attributes.
 The NPRG annual reports on CLECs. For our CLEC data, we use CLEC annual reports
obtained from the New Paradigm Resources Group, Inc. (NPRG). This database contains infor-
mation on the universe of facilities-based CLECs in the United States between 1998 and 2002.11
For each CLEC, we observe the state certifications it held in each year. We also observe the cities
that each CLEC provided with local telephone services in each year and the exact year when the
service started, which we treat as the year the CLEC entered the market. NPRG also reports firm
attributes, such as the year the company was founded, the zip code of the headquarters, whether
the company is publicly traded or privately held, whether the company is venture capital funded,
and whether the company is a subsidiary of a larger telecommunications company.
 Market definition, market characteristics, and sample selection. We combine data on
CLECs with data on market characteristics. The locations in the NPRG reports, that is, the cities
a CLEC provides services to, are best interpreted as census “places.” Therefore, we choose a
census place as our market definition and refer to each as a “city” henceforth.
As most of these CLECs catered to business clientele in the early years of the industry (see,
e.g., NPRG CLEC Reports, 1999–2003; Alexander and Feinberg, 2004; Greenstein and Mazzeo,
2006), the best proxy of market size is the number of business establishments in a city. To collect
data on the number of business establishments for each city, we divide each city into a set of Zip
Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) and obtain the number of business establishments within each
area from the Census’ Zip Code Business Patterns.
Last, we select medium-size cities based on the number of business establishments. We drop
26 US cities, those who had more than 15,000 business establishments in 1997, from our sample
because CLECs in these markets may not serve the whole market and thus may not directly
compete with other CLECs in the same market.12 Furthermore, we drop small cities (those with
less than 2000 business establishments) from our data. The entry rate into these small cities
is extremely low from 1998 to 2002, which suggests that these small cities may not represent
realistic entry candidates. That is, a CLEC holding a state certification may not actually be a
potential entrant in each small city, which makes it difficult to identify the set of potential entrants
for these kinds of cities.13 After dropping all of the markets that do not fit our criteria, we are left
with 398 medium-size cities for our analysis. These cities are listed in web Appendix A.
 Summary statistics. Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics from our data.
Table 1 summarizes the data on firm attributes, which we argue are determinants of a CLEC’s
2000 business establishments – from our analysis because these cities are less likely to be the target areas in the early
years of the competitive US local telephone industry.
11 The NPRG reports are published a year late relative to the year of data collection. The NPRG CLEC annual
reports cover 1996 to the present. However, 1998 is the year when NPRG started to report for the universe, instead of a
selected sample, of facilities-based CLECs. In 2001, NPRG split facilities-based rural CLECs into another report series,
which were published only for the years of 2001 and 2002. Therefore, we are only able to assemble information on the
universe of facilities-based CLECs from 1998 to 2002.
12 Altanta is the smallest city we drop based on this threshold.
13 If we include these small cities into our analysis, we may have a biased estimate of entry costs, because a CLEC
will be considered to be waiting even in markets that it never intends to enter in the first place.
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TABLE 1 Summary Statistics on Firm Attributes
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Variables Mean (Standard Deviation)
Firm-level
Privately held 0.639 0.595 0.576 0.598 0.640
(0.483) (0.493) (0.496) (0.493) (0.483)
Subsidiary 0.320 0.284 0.288 0.268 0.302
(0.469) (0.453) (0.455) (0.445) (0.462)
Financed by venture capital 0.175 0.190 0.220 0.206 0.221
(0.382) (0.394) (0.416) (0.407) (0.417)
Firm agea 8.897 8.526 11.017 13.639 15.616
(20.206) (16.548) (20.680) (23.449) (24.717)
# states with certification 9.237 10.500 13.217 13.135 12.917
(11.438) (11.978) (13.019) (12.484) (12.646)
# cities with certification 100.381 111.138 128.102 122.196 123.209
(108.026) (112.298) (116.251) (114.220) (117.659)
# observations (firm)b 97 116 118 97 86
Firm-market-level
Home state dummy: if market is 0.124 0.110 0.107 0.096 0.102
in the same state as firm headquarters (0.327) (0.313) (0.309) (0.295) (0.303)
Distance from firm headquarters to market 0.901 0.916 0.901 0.876 0.896
in 1000 km (0.680) (0.693) (0.688) (0.675) (0.682)
# observations (firm-market) 9737 12892 15116 11853 10596
aThe average firm age increases by more than one over the years, reflecting entry into Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers (CLEC) business by already established firms.
bAll CLECs in a given year.
TABLE 2 Summary Statistics on Market Attributes
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Variables Mean (Standard Deviation)
# business establishments 3999.565 4022.812 4021.528 4011.382 4091.894
(2437.058) (2439.516) (2439.216) (2427.654) (2469.448)
# incumbentsa 1 1.819 2.661 3.015 3.231
(0) (1.429) (2.269) (2.696) (2.787)
# potential entrants 24.465 31.573 36.319 27.766 24.392
(7.481) (9.616) (10.575) (10.031) (8.578)
# actual new entrants 0.960 1.523 1.638 0.746 0.327
(1.618) (1.798) (2.306) (1.066) (0.597)
Entry rate (among potential entrants) 0.044 0.056 0.051 0.030 0.018
(0.079) (0.072) (0.076) (0.050) (0.037)
1(any competition)b 0.417 0.688 0.729 0.711 0.726
(0.494) (0.464) (0.445) (0.454) (0.447)
# observations (market) 398
aAt the beginning of each year.
bAt the end of each year.
entry costs. These attributes include the organizational, financial, and ownership structure of the
firm, as well as the age of the firm. We also include two measures of the relationship between a
firm and a market it can potentially enter. One is a dummy variable indicating whether the market
is in the same state as the firm’s headquarters. This variable captures a home state advantage, such
as lower costs in passing zoning requirements, dealing with local administration, advertising, and
public relations. The other is a measure of the distance (in 1000 kilometers) between a firm’s
headquarters zip code and the population centroid of a state.
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TABLE 3 Summary Statistics on Entry Patterns, Including Waiting Time
Standard
Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
1(enter any market by 2002) 187 firms 0.775 0.418 0 1
# markets entered by 2002 187 firmsa 11.053 18.731 0 114
1(enter any market in a given year) 514 firms/yearsb 0.578 0.494 0 1
# markets newly entered in a given year 514 firms/years 4.021 8.708 0 104
% markets newly entered in a given yearc 514 firms/years 0.050 0.107 0
1(enter the local market by 2002) 22,192 firms/marketsd 0.849 0.358 0 1
Years in waiting if entered the market by 2002e 18,806 firms/markets 2.056 1.081 0 4
aAll CLECs in our sample.
bAll CLEC-year combinations in our sample.
cThe percentage of markets that firms are certified to enter.
dThe number of unique potential entrant-market combinations that ever appear in the five years of our sample period.
eThe time between when a firm gets state certification and when it actually enters a local market.
We can see from Table 1 that the CLECs in our sample are generally privately held (on
average, 58%–64% across years), with high age variance (the Standard Deviation is about twice
the mean). In addition, a small proportion of these firms are subsidiaries of large corporations (on
average 27%–32% across years) and partially funded by venture capital (on average, 18%–22%
across years). The average number of cities in which a CLEC has state certifications increases
gradually from 1998 and peaks in 2000, right after which the telecommunication market suffered
a stock market crash. The variation in the number of firms over time also reflects the rapid boom-
and-bust pattern in the early years of the telecommunications industry. Overall, the statistics in
Table 1, especially the summary statistics on firm attributes, show that the CLECs in our sample
are heterogeneous. In the model below, we therefore allow firms to be heterogeneous in entry
costs.
Table 2 describes the 398 medium-size cities that we use for our analysis. We can see that
the number of business establishments is gradually increasing until 2001, reflecting the ups and
downs of the macroeconomy. Note that there is only one incumbent for every market at the
beginning of 1998 because only a single ILEC existed in each market at the time of the Act.14
However, after 1998, the number of incumbents fluctuates up and down because entry and exit
are frequent events.15 A typical city in our sample has a large set of potential entrants but only
a few incumbents (including the one ILEC in each market) or new entrants. Furthermore, the
summary statistics show that the number of new entrants first increases during our sample period
and then drops sharply, again echoing the 2001 crash in the stock market. The entry rate, defined
as the number of new entrants divided by the number of potential entrants in a local market,
varies from 0.018 to 0.056 across the years in our sample. As the most effective competition
usually arrives with the first competitor, we also show summary statistics for the existence of any
competition at the end of each year. Specifically, we see that although about 40% of the markets
have at least one CLEC competing with the ILEC as early as 1998, about 30% of the markets are
still monopolistic even at the end of 2002. Overall, the post-Act landscape is uneven in terms of
entry and competition across the 398 markets.
Table 3 describes CLECs’ entry patterns, including waiting time. A few patterns here are
notable. First, firms do wait. Around 22% of the firms do not enter any market by the end of the
sample period, even though they have certification from at least one state. In a given year, only
14 Due to the data limitation explained in footnote 10, we treat 1997 (right after the Act) and 1998 (the first year of
our data) as one period.
15 We treat bankruptcy, being acquired by another firm, or simply going out of business as an exit. In the few cases
of mergers (fewer than 10 out of approximately 200 CLECs in our time period), we treat the smaller CLEC as the firm
exiting from business.
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58% of CLECs entered any market. The average number of local markets a CLEC enters in that
year is four, accounting for about 5% of the markets that the CLEC is certified to enter. Overall,
the average waiting time for a firm to enter amarket after obtaining certification is about two years.
This average is taken across potential entrant-market combinations conditional on the potential
entrant entering the local market by 2002 (so that we observe the waiting time). The unconditional
average waiting time is therefore larger than two years. Second, we find considerable variation in
the waiting time across firms and the entry rates across local markets, suggesting the existence of
firm-level and market-level heterogeneity. The Standard Deviation of the waiting time, reported
in the last row of Table 3, is 1.081 years. The Standard Deviation of entry rates in local markets,
reported in Table 2, is almost always twice the level of the entry rates across years.
4. Model
 The summary statistics on firm attributes (in Table 1) and waiting time (in Table 3) indicate
that potential entrants are heterogeneous and that some of them wait for several years before they
actually enter a local market. To capture these aspects of the data, we use a model based on Pakes,
Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) (henceforth, POB) and add two new features. First, we assume that
potential entrants are long-run players. Under this assumption, in each period, a potential entrant
may choose to enter or to wait, with a potentially positive value of waiting. Second, we allow
different types of potential entrants to face different entry cost distributions.
At the beginning of each year, a firm decides whether to obtain certification from a state
and thereby become a potential entrant in that state’s local markets, if it has not already done
so. Then, entry costs for this potential entrant in each local market are realized.16 Afterward, the
potential entrant decides whether to enter a local market. Therefore, in deciding whether to obtain
certification, a firm considers (i) the incumbents and potential entrants in each local market in the
state, (ii) other characteristics of each local market, (iii) the pool of firms who have not obtained
certification from the state but might be interested in doing so, and (iv) its own expected entry
costs. Information on (i) to (iii) affects the expectation of the firm regarding the aggregate value
of being eligible to enter the local markets of a state, which is state year specific. In contrast,
expected entry costs in (iv) are firm specific. Once we control for the first three using state-year
fixed effects, a firm’s decision to obtain certification reveals its type in terms of entry costs. As the
focus of this article is a potential entrant’s entry decision rather than a firm’s decision to become
a potential entrant, we use the following simple Logit model to explain the decision to become a
potential entrant and infer firms’ entry cost types.
 Afirm’s decision to become a potential entrant. TheLogitmodel of a firm’s (a “potential”
potential entrant’s) decision to become a potential entrant is specified as follows:
Pr
(
certificationfst|z f ,d f s
) = exp
(
ξst + ϕ1z f + ϕ2d f s
)
1 + exp (ξst + ϕ1z f + ϕ2d f s
) , (1)
where the state-year fixed effect, ξst , captures the information in (i) to (iii), and z f and d f s represent
firm and firm-state characteristics, respectively, that affect the entry cost (i.e., the covariates
affecting (iv) above). Specifically, z f includes whether a firm is privately held, whether it is a
subsidiary, whether it is financed by venture capital, and its age in 1998; d f s includes whether the
market is in the same state as the firm’s headquarters (home state dummy), the distance between
the firm’s headquarters and the population centroid of the state, and that distance squared. We use
these three firm-state characteristics to capture the idea that firms may face different entry costs
in different geographies.
16 In other words, a firm’s decision to obtain a state certification is assumed to be exogenous to the entry decision
in a local market in the sense that it is independent of the shock to the cost of entering the local market.
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As the firm characteristics z f and d f s affect the entry cost, with equation (1) estimated, we
use the estimated ϕ to represent the multiple dimensions of firm-level heterogeneity that affect
entry costs with a single index. In other words, ϕˆ1z f + ϕˆ2d f s is a scalar that denotes firm f ’s
type in state s. To restrict the dimensionality of the state space, we also discretize firms’ types.
In particular, we let ϕˆ1z f + ϕˆ2d f s determine whether a firm is of type-1 or of type-2. We explain
the discretization in detail in Section 5.
 A potential entrant’s decision to enter a local market. After obtaining state certification,
a firm becomes a potential entrant and decides whether to enter a market within the state in each
period. As local telephone services are rather homogeneous, market size and competition are
the main driving factors of post entry profits. Therefore, we assume that post entry profits are
identical across firms within a market and otherwise depend only on the size of the market and
the number of incumbents.17 Let mct be the market size and nct be the number of incumbents
in city c and year t . We assume that the one-period profit function has the following parametric
form:
π (mct , nct ) = eαmct+γ nct , (2)
where α (the market-size effect) and γ (the competition effect) are parameters to be estimated.
Note that the exponential function form ensures that profits are always positive.18
At the beginning of each period, a potential entrant observes its entry cost. The realized entry
cost, which is independently distributed across firms, markets, and time, is a potential entrant’s
private information. This distribution of the entry cost, which is public information, depends on
a potential entrant’s type. Given that firm attributes are observed by all firms, the number of
potential entrants of each type in a city is common knowledge. To summarize, at the beginning
of each period, a potential entrant to a market observes the number of potential entrants of each
type (T1ct , T2ct ) as well as the market conditions (mct , nct ). These are the relevant state variables
for firms’ decisions. The market size, mct , evolves exogenously according to a first-order Markov
process. The number of incumbents, nct , is endogenous: its transition follows nct+1 = nct +
(# new entrants)1ct + (# new entrants)2ct − (# exi ted incumbents)ct . The transition of the
number of potential entrants is determined by Tτct+1 = Tτct + (# new potential entrants)τct −
(# exi ted potential entrants)
τct − (# new entrants)τct for τ = 1, 2. New potential entrants in
market c in year t are CLECs who in year t got certification in the state in which market c lies.
As explained, we assume that (# new potential entrants)τct is exogenous and i.i.d. across cities
and years. Note that sometimes a CLEC exits the industry as a whole and ceases to be a potential
entrant in any market. That is why we need to consider (# exi ted potential entrants)τct in the
transition of the number of potential entrants. For notational simplicity, we suppress subscripts c
and t for the remainder of this section. In addition, from now on, whenever it is not obvious what
we mean by “state,” we use the phrase “geographic state” for a US state such as California, and
the word “state” for a state in the model.
If a potential entrant decides to enter a market, we assume it will start to earn profits in the
next period after paying an up-front cost of entry in the current period. The value of entry is
therefore the expected value of being an incumbent in the next period. Let V I (m, n, T1, T2) be the
value of an incumbent at state (m, n, T1, T2). Then,
V I (m, n, T1, T2) = π (m, n) + δE(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2)V
I
(
m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2
)
, (3)
17 The assumption of homogeneity in post entry profits across firms in a market is necessary for identification. With
only entry data, we cannot determine whether different entry timing across firms reflects the heterogeneity in post entry
profits or the heterogeneity in entry costs. Given that local telephone services are rather homogeneous, we have decided
to allow for the latter heterogeneity while assuming that post entry profits are identical.
18 This exponential functional form also allows for nonlinear effects of themarket size and the number of incumbents
in the profit function. For example, when γ , which captures the competition effect, is negative, this functional form allows
the marginal effect of an additional competitor on profit to decrease with the number of competitors.
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where δ is the discount factor and E(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2) is the expectation of the state in the next
period (m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2 ), conditional on the current state (m, n, T1, T2).
Note that an incumbent in such a dynamic game typically also decides whether to continue
operating at the end of each period. We choose not to endogenize this decision for two reasons.
First, in our data, an incumbent always stays in the local market until the CLEC exits as a whole,
which is consistent with the observation that the variable costs of maintaining operations are low.
If exit were a firm-level endogenous decision, we could not treat the firm’s entry decisions into
local markets as independent across markets. This would dramatically increase the state space
of our dynamic problem (and hence our data requirements). Second, during our sample period,
firm exits appear to be largely due to exogenous macroeconomic shocks.19 We thus assume that
a firm exits as a whole exogenously and that all firms have the same expected probability of exit,
denoted by px . Note that px is common knowledge among all firms. Hence, δ in equation (3) is
in fact the discount factor adjusted for the expected probability of exit: δ = β(1 − px ), where β
is the standard discount factor.
A potential entrant decides whether to enter by comparing the value of waiting with the
value of entry net of entry costs. As explained, the value of entry is the expected value of
being an incumbent in the next period, that is, δEe(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ )V
I (m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2 ), where
Ee(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ ) is a type-τ potential entrant’s expectation regarding future states conditional
on itself entering.20 The value of waiting is the expected value of being a potential entrant in the
next period. Let V E (m, n, T1, T2, τ, ζ ) be the value of a potential entrant of type τ with entry
costs ζ . Then, the value of waiting is δEw(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ )Eζ
′ |τV E (m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2 , τ, ζ
′), where
Ew(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ ) is a type-τ potential entrant’s expectation regarding future states conditional
on the firm itself waiting at state (m, n, T1, T2), and Eζ ′ |τ is the expectation of its entry cost in the
next period. A potential entrant compares the value of entry net of entry costs with the value of
waiting and decides whether to enter. Thus, the value of a potential entrant satisfies the following
equation:
V E (m, n, T1, T2, τ, ζ ) = max
{
δEe(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ )
V I
(
m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2
) − ζ,
δEw(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ )
Eζ ′ |τV
E
(
m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2 , τ, ζ
′)} . (4)
Because a firm may also exit as a whole with probability px , the same discount factor δ for the
incumbent is used.
A potential entrant decides to enter if the value of entry net of entry costs is larger than the
value of waiting. In other words, the probability of entry for a type-τ potential entrant is
pe (m, n, T1, T2, τ )
= Prτ
(
ζ < δEe(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ )
V I
(
m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2
)
−δEw(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ )Eζ ′ |τV
E
(
m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2 , τ, ζ
′)) . (5)
We assume that a potential entrant’s entry cost, ζ, follows a gamma distribution with mean
μ1 for type-1 firms and mean μ2 for type-2 firms. As usual in discrete choice models, we can
19 When we regress a firm exit dummy on firm attributes and year dummies using a linear probability model, we
find that the estimated coefficients of firm attributes are small and statistically insignificant, whereas year dummies play
an important role in explaining variation in exit. This finding suggests that firm exit is indeed driven by macroeconomic
shocks rather than inherent firm-level heterogeneity.
20 The expectation is type specific for two reasons: first, conditional on its own action, a type-1 potential entrant’s
perception regarding the number of incumbents in the next period depends on its belief about howmany out of (T 1 − 1, T 2)
potential entrants will enter, whereas a type-2’s perception hinges on how many out of (T 1, T 2 − 1) potential entrants
will enter; second, the same argument about type dependence also holds for a potential entrant’s perception of the number
of potential entrants in the next period.
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only identify model parameters up to a scale. We therefore normalize the variance of the entry
cost to be 1.
Following the literature on dynamic games of oligopoly competition, we assume that the
data come from a Markov perfect equilibrium of our model. An equilibrium is a triple of policy
and value functions (pe, V I , V E ) such that for any potential entrant, (i) given that other potential
entrants follow the policy function, pe, the value functions V I and V E are the fixed point of
the Bellman equations (3) and (4), and (ii) given that other potential entrants follow the policy
function, pe, and the value functions V I and V E , pe satisfies equation (5). The expectations
in these equations are formed based on a potential entrant’s beliefs, which coincide with the
equilibrium policies at the equilibrium.
5. Estimation
 The estimation process is carried out in two main steps. In the first step, we classify each
potential entrant by its type. To this end, we estimate (ϕ1, ϕ2) in the Logit regression from equation
(1). We then compute ϕˆ1z f + ϕˆ2d f s for each firm-state and divide the potential entrants into two
groups: a firm f is of type-1 in geographic state s if and only if ϕˆ1z f + ϕˆ2d f s is below the median
of all firm-states; otherwise, this firm is of type-2 in geographic state s. We expect type-1 potential
entrants to have higher entry costs on average than type-2 potential entrants. We do not impose
this restriction (i.e., the mean of the entry cost for type-1 potential entrants (μ1) be larger than the
mean for type-2 (μ2)) in our estimation. However, as we will show, the estimation results confirm
the expected ranking.
In the second step of our estimation, we estimate the parameters in the profit function,
(α, γ ), and the parameters in the entry costs distributions, (μ1, μ2). As mentioned, the discount
factor in the model is adjusted by the probability of exiting: δ = β(1 − px ), where β is the
standard discount factor and px is the expected exit probability. We estimate the model using
different values for β and study the robustness of our results with respect to these values. We set
the mean exit probability px to be the empirical average exit probability at the firm level, which
is 23.9% from 1999 to 2002. The estimation of (α, γ, μ1, μ2) follows the procedure in POB with
one modification: we need to consistently estimate the value of waiting as well as the value of
entry.
To estimate the above parameters, it is convenient to rewrite equation (3) in vector form,
comparable to the procedure in POB. The state in this model is a quadruple (m, n, T1, T2). We
denote the i th state by (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ). With a slight abuse of notation, we let V I (α, γ ) be the
vector with V I (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ) as its i th element. Similarly, the i th element of the vector π (α, γ )
is π (mi , ni ). Using this notation, we can rewrite equation (3) in vector form:
V I (α, γ ) = π (α, γ ) + δMV I (α, γ ) , (6)
where M is the transition probability matrix, that is, its i j-element is the transition probability
from state (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ) to (m j , n j , T1 j , T2 j ). This matrix M is estimated directly from data.
To rewrite equation (4) in vector form, we define vectors Ve1(α, γ ) and Ve2(α, γ ) as the values
of entry for a type-1 and type-2 potential entrant, respectively. Their i th elements are the expected
value of being an incumbent in the next period, that is, Ee(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i ,τ )V
I (m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2 )
for τ = 1 and 2 , respectively. In other words,
Veτ (α, γ ) = Meτ V I (α, γ ) , (7)
where Me
τ
is a matrix whose i j-element is the transition probability from (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ) to
(m j , n j , T1 j , T2 j ) conditional on a type-τ potential entrant entering.
Similarly, we define the vector Vwτ (α, γ, μτ ) as the value of waiting for a type-τ potential
entrant, whose i th element is the expected value of being a potential entrant in the next period,
that is, Ew(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i ,τ )Eζ
′ |τV E (m ′, n′, T ′1 , T
′
2 , τ, ζ
′). We also define the vector pe
τ
as the
probability of entry for a type-τ potential entrant analogously. Then, applying the expectation
C© The RAND Corporation 2015.
FAN AND XIAO / 763
operator Ew(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ )Eζ |τ on both sides of equation (4), we have the value of waiting
satisfying the following equation in vector form21:
Vwτ (α, γ, μτ ) = Mwτ
{
pe
τ
(
δVeτ (α, γ ) − E
[
ζ |ζ < δVeτ (α, γ ) − δVwτ (α, γ, μτ ) ;μτ
])
(8)
+ (1 − pe
τ
)
δVwτ (α, γ, μτ )
}
,
where Mw
τ
is a matrix whose i j-element is the transition probability from (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ) to
(m j , n j , T1 j , T2 j ) conditional on a type-τ potential entrant waiting.
To estimate Veτ (α, γ ) and Vwτ (α, γ, μτ ), we need consistent estimates of the transition
probability matrices M , Me
τ
, and Mw
τ
. To obtain these estimates, we follow the procedure in POB.
That is, we use empirical counterparts of these matrices. See the Appendix for the details on how
we obtain Mˆ, Mˆe1 , Mˆ
e
2 , Mˆ
w
1 , and Mˆ
w
2 .
With Mˆ, Mˆe1 , Mˆ
e
2 , Mˆ
w
1 , and Mˆ
w
2 estimated, the estimate of the value of entry is given by
Vˆeτ (α, γ ) = Mˆeτ Vˆ Iτ (α, γ ) , (9)
where
Vˆ I
τ
(α, γ ) = (I − δMˆ)−1π (α, γ ) , (10)
and I is the identity matrix. Meanwhile, Vˆwτ (α, γ, μτ ) is the fixed point of (8) when Veτ (α, γ )
and Mw
τ
are replaced by their empirical counterparts. Note that the RHS of equation (8) is a
contraction mapping of Vwτ (α, γ, μτ ) because ζ is assumed to be a log-concave random variable
(with a gamma distribution), and it follows that 0 ≤ ∂E(ζ |ζ<d)
∂d
≤ 1 (see Heckman and Honore´,
1990).
Having obtained consistent estimates of the values of entry and waiting, we can now get
consistent estimates of the probabilities of entry for given parameters. As shown in equation (5),
the probability of entry at state (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ) is the probability that the entry costs for a firm
are smaller than the difference between the discounted value of entry and the discounted value of
waiting at the given state.
We estimate the distribution parameters (μ1, μ2) and the profit parameters (α, γ ) using the
Generalized Method of Moments. We observe the state of each year-market combination. The
model prediction of the probability of entry in this year-market is therefore determined by the
element in the entry probability vector pe
τ
(α, γ, μ
τ
) that corresponds to this state. Its empirical
counterpart is the fraction of type- τ potential entrants in this year-market that enter. The difference
between the model prediction and the empirical probability of entry is the prediction error, which
we compute for each firm type and year-market. We use the Euclidian norm of the prediction
errors as well as the covariances between the prediction errors and the following variables as
moment conditions: market size, the total number of potential entrants, the percentage of type-1
potential entrants, and a year 2001 dummy.
Identification of structural parameters (α, γ, μ1 , μ2) is similar to that in POB. For example,
the market size coefficient, α, is identified by howmuch entry probabilities vary with market size.
The competition coefficient, γ, is identified similarly; that is, by how entry probabilities change
with different numbers of incumbents in a local market. The variation in the number of incumbents
is affected by the variation in the number of potential entrants, which itself is largely driven by
the number of new potential entrants. The year 2001 dummy captures the macroeconomic crash
in that year, which presumably shrank the number of potential entrants. Last, the difference in
the entry probabilities of type-1 and type-2 potential entrants identifies the difference in entry
costs of these two types. Together with the levels of entry probabilities, these differences help us
identify the parameters (μ1 , μ2).
21 Note that Eζ max(b − ζ, a) = Pr(ζ < b − a)[b − E(ζ |ζ < b − a)] + [1 − Pr(ζ < b − a)]a.
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TABLE 4 Firms’ Decisions to Obtain State Certificationa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Logit OLS Logit
1(the CLEC is privately held) −0.094 −1.154 −0.093 −1.229
(0.004)*** (0.057)*** (0.004)*** (0.059)***
1(the CLEC is a subsidiary of a firm) −0.054 −0.759 −0.056 −0.830
(0.004)*** (0.062)*** (0.004)*** (0.064)***
1(the CLEC is funded by venture capital) 0.030 0.491 0.032 0.561
(0.005)*** (0.070)*** (0.005)*** (0.073)***
Log of firm age in 1998 0.004 0.041 0.002 0.038
(0.002)* (0.023)* (0.002) (0.025)
Home state dummy 0.651 3.252 0.585 2.879
(0.021)*** (0.218)*** (0.020)*** (0.233)***
Distance between headquarters and state −0.226 −2.407 −0.217 −2.500
(0.012)*** (0.141)*** (0.013)*** (0.162)***
Distance squared 0.067 0.708 0.058 0.650
(0.005)*** (0.057)*** (0.005)*** (0.065)***
Constant 0.297 −0.220 0.304
(0.008)*** (0.089)** (0.009)***
State-year fixed effects included No No Yes Yes
R2 0.111 0.160
Log Likelihood −6137.563 −5106.745
Observations (firm-state-year) 21430 21430 21430 20681b
OLS = ordinary least squares. Standard errors in parentheses.
a“Potential” potential entrants’ decisions to become a potential entrant.
bFor 10 state-year combinations (corresponding to 749 observations), no firm obtained state certification and therefore
these groups are dropped from the Logit regressions with state-year fixed effects.
*significant at 10%. **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%.
6. Results
 State certification regression results. Table 4 presents the results from the regressions of
firm decisions to obtain state certification for the first time, as described in the first subsection of
Section 4. The first two columns present the ordinary least squares (OLS) and Logit regression
results, whereas the last two present their counterparts with state-year fixed effects. Comparing
the results with and without state-year fixed effects, we can see that including such fixed effects
significantly improves the model’s fit to the data, particularly for the Logit model. This improve-
ment suggests the importance of using state-year fixed effects to capture a general expectation
of aggregate value of being eligible to enter in a given geographic state s and year t . The results
in the last two columns of Table 4 indicate that the observed firm attributes are key determinants
of firm decisions to obtain state certification. CLECs that are privately held or subsidiaries of
other firms are significantly less likely to obtain state certification. This finding may reflect the
fact that such CLECs typically do not have a deep pocket and their opportunity cost of using
capital is high. In contrast, those funded by venture capital, and thus with a higher ability to
finance, are more likely to obtain certification. We also find that CLECs are significantly less
likely to obtain state certification in states further from their headquarters: the home state dummy
has a significant positive impact on a CLEC’s obtaining state certification; the distance between
a CLEC’s headquarters zip code and the population centroid of the state it obtains certification
from has a significant negative impact, though such a negative impact is diminishing with the
distance. Overall, it seems that CLECs may have a home state cost advantage and have higher
entry costs into a more distant geography.
As described in the first subsection of Section 4, we use the results from the certification
regression (Column 4, Table 4) to categorize firms into two types: type-1 and type-2. Firms with
ϕˆ1z f + ϕˆ2d f s smaller than the median are labeled as type-1 in geographic state s and those with
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TABLE 5 Summary Statistics on Potential Entrant Types
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
# potential entrants 28.903 10.365 5 56
# type-1 potential entrants 16.243 8.442 1 38
# type-2 potential entrants 12.660 6.794 1 34
Entry rate 0.040 0.067 0 0.5
Type-1 potential entrants’ entry rate 0.029 0.066 0 0.6
Type-2 potential entrants’ entry rate 0.055 0.100 0 1
# observations (market-year) 1990
TABLE 6 Estimation Results for Structural Parameters
β=
Parameter 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80
α (market size effect) 0.150*** 0.162*** 0.173*** 0.188***
(0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
γ (competition effect) −0.026 −0.030*** −0.033*** −0.037***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
μ1 (entry cost mean for type-1) 10.082*** 9.315*** 8.693*** 8.176***
(0.918) (0.489) (0.476) (0.466)
μ2 (entry cost mean for type-2) 9.671*** 8.917*** 8.308*** 7.802***
(0.917) (0.485) (0.475) (0.464)
***Significant at 1%.
this measure larger than the median are labeled as type-2. Any market-year combination can
now be characterized by four state variables: market size (the log of the number of business
establishments), number of incumbents (including a single ILEC and CLECs), number of type-1
potential entrants, and number of type-2 potential entrants. Table 5 reports the summary statistics
on the types of potential entrants. From this table, we can see that we have, on average, more
type-1 than type-2 potential entrants in a local market and that there is substantial variation in
the distributions of types.22 In the data, the entry rate for type-1 potential entrants is, on average,
0.029, whereas that for type-2 potential entrants is 0.055.23 This difference in entry probabilities
helps us identify the difference in entry costs for the two types of potential entrants.
 Estimates of structural parameters. Table 6 reports the estimation results for the four
structural parameters in the model: the two parameters in the profit function (the market size
effect, α, and the competition effect, γ) and the two parameters describing the distribution of
entry costs for each type of potential entrants (mean μ1 and μ2).24 Table 6 reports, in different
columns, the estimation results when the unadjusted discount factor β is chosen to be 0.95, 0.9,
0.85, and 0.8, respectively. It is not surprising that the estimation results vary with the discount
factor. For example, as the discount factor decreases, the estimated entry cost means decrease.
This is intuitive: when firms discount the future payoffs more, the entry cost (that potential
entrants need to pay now) must be smaller to explain the same entry behavior. As we show in web
22 Note that the median cutoff we use in determining a firm’s type in a geographic state is the median across
firm-states, whereas the local market is a city within a geographic state. Therefore, it is possible that type-1 and type-2
firms are unevenly distributed within a local market. Moreover, a firm is no longer a potential entrant after entry. Given
that type-1 firms, on average, have a lower entry rate (see Table 5), it is not surprising that there are more type-1 potential
entrants, on average, across year-markets.
23 The entry rate for type-τ potential entrants is defined as the number of type-τ entrants over the number of type-τ
potential entrants in the local market.
24 To take into account the estimation error in the first-stage estimation of a firm’s decision to become a potential
entrant, we bootstrap to estimate the standard errors.
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Appendix B, however, the fit of the model and the results from the counterfactual simulations as
explained below are robust. In what follows, we focus on the estimation results in the first column
of Table 6 where ß = 0.95.
The estimation results are rather intuitive. For example, market size, measured by the
logarithm of the number of business establishments, has a positive effect on the incumbent’s
operating profit. This is in line with Bresahan and Reiss (1991), who find that a larger market
size is necessary to support more competitors. It also implies that smaller markets may get stuck
with a monopolistic structure, as these markets do not have sufficient demand to attract entry.
Furthermore, we see that the number of incumbents negatively affects the operating profit of an
incumbent. This result confirms the conventional wisdom that a higher number of incumbents in
a market erodes the average profitability per firm.25
The estimate for the mean of a type-1 potential entrant’s entry cost is 10.082, higher than
that for a type-2 potential entrant. Recall that we group firms into two types based on their
propensity to obtain state certification – type-1 firms have lower propensity than type-2 firms. In
the estimation, we do not impose any restriction on the ranking of the entry cost mean for these
two types, μ1 and μ2. We find that type-1 potential entrants indeed have higher entry costs on
average than type-2 potential entrants. Put together, these results show that firms who are more
likely to obtain state certification have lower entry costs. This finding is consistent with intuition.
The difference between type-1’s and type-2’s entry cost means is statistically significant at
the 1% level. As we will show in the third subsection of Section 7, this difference has significant
economic implications for firms’ entry behavior.
Overall, our estimates imply that the net value of entry (the value of entry minus the average
entry cost) for type-1 potential entrants varies between −0.036 and 1.430 depending on the state,
and that the net value of entry for type-2 potential entrants varies between 0.376 and 1.846.
Given that our rough measure of the average entry cost per market is $6.5 million, the net
value of entry for type-1 potential entrants then amounts to between −$24,000 to $941,000 per
market.26 Similarly, the net value of entry for type-2 potential entrants varies between $247,000
and $1,215,000 per market. In comparison, the value of waiting varies between 0.006 and 0.090
($4,000 and $60,000) for type-1 potential entrants and between 0.021 and 0.199 ($14,000 and
$131,000) for type-2 potential entrants, around 10% of the net value of entry. Note that the value
of waiting for type-1 high-cost potential entrants is smaller than that for type-2 low-cost potential
entrants. This is mainly because the value of waiting is in part influenced by a potential entrant’s
perception of how likely it is to enter in the future. For example, at the extreme, if a potential
entrant thinks that it will never enter, its option value of waiting is zero. As type-1 potential
entrants have a lower probability of entry than type-2 potential entrants, their value of waiting is
also smaller.
 Fit of the model. To ensure that our model captures the dynamics of entry behavior in the
industry, we compare the distribution of the market structure from the observed data with the
predictions from our model. Figure 1 shows the percentage of markets with n CLECs from 1999
to 2002 for n = 0, 1, 2, and above. The data shows that local markets become increasingly com-
petitive over time. However, monopoly markets (markets with no CLECs) continue to represent a
significant proportion of all markets. The prediction from the estimated model displays the same
25 This competition effect, however, is statistically insignificant. This may be due to unobserved market hetero-
geneity. Local markets differ in demand (e.g., the affluence level of local markets), in cost of laying out the network
(e.g., various terrain conditions), and even in how hard ILECs compete with new entrants. Due to data limitations, we are
unable to capture such heterogeneity. If more profitable markets (in unobservable dimensions) attract more entrants, we
may underestimate the competition effect.
26 The number –24,000 is obtained when we scale –0.036 by 6, 500, 000/( μˆ1+μˆ2
2
), where μˆ1+μˆ2
2
is the entry cost
mean averaged across the two types of firms. Similarly, the number 941,000 is obtained by scaling 1.430 by the same
factor.
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FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF MARKET STRUCTURE: DATA VS. MODEL PREDICTION
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Note: CLECs = Competitive Local Exchange Carriers.
pattern. From the comparison, we can see that our estimated model fits the overall evolution of
local market structures rather well. If anything, our model tends to slightly overestimate entry.
 Comparison to POB. In this article, we take advantage of a unique feature of the US local
telephone industry and identify potential entrants to a local market as CLECs with certification
to operate in that state. Knowing who the potential entrants are allows us to observe how long
a firm waits to enter a market and firm-level attributes associated with the cost of entry. Data
indicate that potential entrants are heterogeneous and that some of them wait for several years
before they actually enter a local market. To capture these features of the data, our model differs
from POB to allow for a value of waiting and for firm heterogeneity. In this section, we compare
the estimation results and the fit with the data using our model to the results and the fit using the
original POB model, in which potential entrants are not observed and hence there is no waiting.
To this end, we estimate the POB model assuming that the number of potential entrants in
each market is 20, 30, or 40.27 We also estimate a hybrid model where we use the actual number of
potential entrants in computing the empirical conditional probabilities of entry in the first-stage
estimation of the POB model, but not as a state variable in the second-stage estimation. In the
POB model and the hybrid model, a potential entrant either enters a market or perishes (i.e., there
is no value of waiting). Table 7 presents the estimation results from our model, the POB model
with different assumptions on the number of potential entrants, and the hybrid model. As shown
in Table 7, these alternative models produce much larger estimates of the market size effect, the
competition effect, and the entry cost means. We believe these changes are due to the information
lost when we do not allow the number of different-type potential entrants to play a role. In the POB
model and the hybrid model, the number of potential entrants, which affects the competitiveness
of a market, is not included as a state variable. The two remaining state variables, the number of
incumbents and the market size, have to explain the same variation in the probability of entry,
leading to larger estimates of their coefficients. With these estimates, the profit is also larger,
which in turn leads to a larger estimate of entry cost means. In the hybrid model, which uses the
number of potential entrants in a limited way (no firm-level heterogeneity and not included in the
state space), the overestimation of estimated coefficients is smaller, again pointing to the value of
gaining information from the waiting structure.
27 The mean and the median of the number of potential entrants in our data is 29.
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TABLE 7 Estimation Results: Our Model vs. POB
POB
# Potential Entrants =
Parameter Our Model Hybrid 20 30 40
α (market size effect) 0.150*** 0.247*** 0.283*** 0.272*** 0.264***
(0.023) (0.048) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
γ (competition effect) −0.026 −0.112*** −0.137*** −0.131*** −0.128***
(0.021) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
μ (entry cost mean) 14.904*** 17.961*** 16.965*** 16.415***
(3.690) (3.662) (3.337) (3.155)
μ1 (entry cost mean for type-1) 10.082***
(0.918)
μ2 (entry cost mean for type-2) 9.671***
(0.917)
***Significant at 1%.
FIGURE 2
MODEL FIT COMPARISON: OUR MODEL VS. POB
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These estimates have direct consequences for the model’s fit with the data. Figure 2 shows
that our model fits the data better than the POB model and the hybrid model. As in the previous
subsection, we show the percentage of markets with n CLECs from 1999 to 2002 for n = 0, 1, 2,
and above. We show this distribution of the market structure in the data, as predicted by our
model, the hybrid model, and the POB model. Figure 2 indicates that our model fits the data the
best. Let xdatant be the share of markets with n CLECs in year t observed in the data and x
est
nt be
its estimated counterpart. We compute a measure for the fit of the market structure distribution
as
∑
n=1,2,3+
∑2002
t=1999(x
data
nt − xestnt )2. The value of this measure is 0.133 for our model, 0.355 for
the hybrid model, and 0.472, 0.351, and 0.305 for the POB model with 20, 30, and 40 potential
entrants, respectively. That is, our model predicts a market structure closest to what we observe
in the data. Because in the counterfactual policy simulations below, we focus on how subsidies
change market structure, we think it is assuring that our model fits the market structure in the data
well. In addition, we will show in the next section that ignoring the identity of potential entrants
leads to biased estimates of the effects of entry subsidies.
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TABLE 8 The Effect of Subsidies on Percentage of Monopoly Markets
Percentage of Monopoly Markets (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002
Subsidy to all markets and any entrant
(1) No subsidy 52.00 34.97 29.96 23.07
(2) 5% subsidy, all markets, both types 32.45 15.53 12.29 7.49
(3) 10% subsidy, all markets, both types 13.77 3.11 2.49 1.39
Subsidy to small markets only
(4) 7.3% equivalent subsidy, small markets onlya 25.30 8.93 7.35 3.90
(5) 12.6% equivalent subsidy, small markets onlyb 10.17 1.59 1.54 0.71
Subsidy to high-cost or low-cost CLECs only
(6) 10% subsidy, high-cost type only 30.85 14.44 13.47 7.45
(7) 10% subsidy, low-cost type only 22.30 9.60 7.45 4.85
(8) 13.5% equivalent subsidy, low-cost type onlyc 14.00 5.12 4.28 2.77
Subsidy in 1998 only
(9) 10% subsidy, 1998 only 8.72 8.35 12.51 11.21
(10) 16.7% equivalent subsidy, 1998 onlyd 1.01 1.25 3.56 4.13
aA 5% subsidy to all markets is equivalent to a 7.3% subsidy to small markets only. Under these two subsidy schemes,
the total amount of subsidy paid in these four years is the same.
bA 10% subsidy to all markets is equivalent to a 12.6% subsidy to small markets only.
cA 10% subsidy to both types of potential entrants is equivalent to a 13.5% subsidy to low-cost potential entrants only.
dA 10% subsidy in all years is equivalent to a 16.7% subsidy in 1998 only.
7. Counterfactuals
 Having ascertained that our model is a good fit for the data, we now study various subsidy
policies for encouraging further entry after the Act. Note that the Act includes policies that
can be interpreted as implicit nondiscriminatory subsidies to every entrant, most notably in the
form of forcing ILECs to interconnect with CLECs and to lease their networks and facilities to
CLECs at rates based on long-run average costs. Aided by these policies, CLECs are able to avoid
negotiating interconnection agreements or building overlapping networks with ILECs.28 In the
simulations that follow, we study several explicit subsidy policies on top of the existing policies
and examine their effects on promoting competitiveness in local markets. All of the policies
studied subsidize the entry cost. Throughout the analysis, we focus on comparing the impact of
these policies on reducing the number of monopoly markets.29 In the simulations below, we keep
the set of CLECs holding a certification from a state the same as that in the data.
 Subsidy to every new entrant in all markets. Table 8 shows how applying a subsidy to
every entrant could encourage entry into local markets. The first row shows the status quo—the
model-simulated distribution of market structures with no subsidies.30 Row (2) and Row (3) show,
28 The subsidies imposed by the Act are implicit and thus difficult to quantify. One may worry that these implicit
subsidies, which lower average variable costs by allowing CLECs to rent networks and facilities from ILECs, vary across
markets and thus impact our estimates. However, the main component of CLECs’ average variable cost is maintaining and
servicing the networks and facilities. It is thus reasonable to assume that these subsidies are only a function of the size of
the network, which depends on market size alone. Therefore, most of the unobserved market-level policy heterogeneity
is captured by market size, which is already included in the model.
29 Although a market could theoretically become more competitive even without entry, as the mere threat of entry
after the Act could make the incumbent act more competitively, there is little evidence on such effects. On the other hand,
some studies have found a positive welfare effect of an increase in the actual number of competitors in the local phone
industry (see, e.g., Economides, Seim, and Viard, 2008).
30 We use a model-simulated market structure because we do not want realizations of unobservables in the data to
affect the comparison between results with and without subsidies. Furthermore, we have shown above that the simulated
market structure is close to the observed market structure.
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TABLE 9 Change in Percentage of Monopoly Market under a 5% Subsidy: Our Model vs. POB
Percentage of Monopoly Markets (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002
Our model −20.00 −19.65 −17.92 −15.27
Hybrid −8.67 −7.63 −7.79 −6.66
POB, 20 potential entrants −10.05 −7.49 −7.54 −6.77
POB, 30 potential entrants −8.78 −6.71 −6.53 −5.42
POB, 40 potential entrants −7.54 −4.98 −5.64 −4.26
respectively, the effect of a subsidy equaling 5% and 10% of the entry cost mean averaged across
the two types (i.e. 5% and 10% of (μˆ1 + μˆ2)/2) to every entrant in every local market. From
Table 8, we can see that the 5% subsidy reduces the share of monopoly markets to 32% by the
beginning of 1999 (compared to 52% without any subsidy), whereas the 10% subsidy further
reduces this share to 14% over the same period. By the beginning of 2002, the 5% subsidy reduces
the percentage of monopoly markets to less than 10% (compared to 23% without any subsidy),
whereas the 10% subsidy nearly eliminates monopoly markets.
We have shown that our model fits the data better than the POBmodel and the hybrid model.
To understand whether this difference in fitting the data and the different estimates across the
two models also have economic significance, we next investigate whether they have different
implications for evaluating the effect of subsidy policies. To this end, we simulate the effect of
a 5% subsidy to every entrant in all markets using the estimated POB models with different
assumptions on the number of potential entrants. We do so using the estimated hybrid model as
well, where the number of potential entrants is taken from the data. However, we still maintain the
assumption that potential entrants either enter or exit and that theymake their entry decisions based
on the assumption that a fixed number of potential entrants are born every period. We compare
the simulated results in Table 9. For example, our model predicts a drop in the percentage of
monopoly markets by 20% (from 52%–32%) in 1999 under a 5% subsidy to every entrant in all
markets. The predicted change using the POB model or the hybrid model varies between 7.5%
and 10%, depending on the assumption about the number of potential entrants. Overall, we can
see from Table 9 that the estimated POB model underestimates the subsidy effect by more than
50%. Note that in the POB model and the hybrid model, firms think that there is a fixed number
of potential entrants born every period, and thus an entry subsidy does not affect the number
of potential entrants. However, in fact, such a subsidy can lead to more entries now and hence
decreases the number of potential entrants in the future, which increases the value of entry for
a firm. Thus, ignoring the effect of a subsidy on the number of potential entrants leads to an
underestimation of the subsidy’s effect on entry.
Returning to the discussion on the effect of subsidies, though applying a subsidy to every
entrant in every market is effective, it may also be costly. In our model, the number of monopoly
markets under a subsidy equaling 5% (10%) of the average entry cost would be the same as in a
scenario where there is a 5.1% (10%) exogenous increase in market size of every market and in
every period. Recall that an increase in the market size leads to higher post entry profit and hence
attracts more entry. Another way to understand the magnitude of the subsidy is to use information
on the annual capital expenditures that we observe for the majority of the CLECs. Recall from
Section 2 that the average entry cost per market is calculated to be $6.5 million. This translates
into roughly $325,000 per firm for a 5% subsidy and $650,000 for a 10% subsidy. The question
that arises next is: can alternative subsidy designs that target selected markets or selected CLECs
be more cost effective?
 Subsidy in small markets only. To answer the above question, we study in this section
whether offering a subsidy in small markets only, that is, in cities with fewer than 5000 business
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establishments in 1998, is more effective at reducing monopoly markets.31 In other words, for the
same amount of total subsidy paid, does a subsidy in small markets only lead to fewer monopoly
markets than a subsidy applied to all markets? Intuitively, on the one hand, a small market is
less attractive to potential entrants. The same amount of subsidy per firm may be less effective
at encouraging entry into small markets than at encouraging entry into larger markets. Thus, a
higher subsidy for each entrant would be needed. On the other hand, small markets are more
likely to be monopoly markets before a subsidy. Therefore, a subsidy encouraging entry into a
small market may immediately eliminate a monopoly, whereas a subsidy in a larger market may
only help to add another competitor to an already relatively competitive market.
To study the overall effect of a small market subsidy, we use the simulation results in the
previous subsection as the benchmark. Doing so, we find that, in terms of costs, a 5% subsidy
in all markets is equivalent to a 7.3% subsidy in only small markets. In other words, under these
two subsidy schemes, the total amount of subsidy paid in 1998 to 2001 is the same. Similarly,
we see that a 10% subsidy in all markets is equivalent to a 12.6% subsidy in small markets only.
Rows (4) and (5) of Table 8 show the percentage of monopoly markets under these equivalent
subsidies in small markets only. The comparison of Row (2) (5% subsidy in all markets) and Row
(4) (the corresponding equivalent subsidy in small markets only) shows that providing a subsidy
in small markets only is more effective than providing a subsidy in all markets. The same amount
of money spent leads to a larger reduction in the share of monopoly markets in all years of our
study. The comparison of Row (3) and Row (5) for the effect of a 10% subsidy in all markets and
the effect of its equivalent subsidy in small markets yields the same result. This result indicates
that the first effect (a higher subsidy per entrant is needed to attract entry into a smaller market)
is dominated by the second effect (the subsidy to small markets only is more likely to be right on
target at reducing monopoly markets).
We have shown that a small-market-only subsidy policy is more cost effective at reducing the
number of monopoly markets. However, is it more desirable from a welfare point of view? On the
one hand, it leads to a larger reduction in monopoly markets. On the other hand, it affects fewer
customers per market. This trade-off is similar to a trade-off between a positive extensive margin
effect and a negative intensive margin effect. To investigate the overall effect, we now examine
the effect of different subsidy policies on the percentage of business establishments located
in monopoly markets (in addition to the percentage of monopoly markets as studied above).
According to our simulation results, under the all-market 5% subsidy, the percentages of business
establishments located in monopoly markets are 24.43%, 11.07%, 9.25%, and 5.67% in 1999,
2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively. Under the equivalent small-market subsidy, they become
22.37%, 7.31%, 6.25%, and 3.33%. In other words, the equivalent small-market-only subsidy is
more effective at reducing not only the number of monopoly markets, but also the number of
business establishments located in monopoly markets. Thus, even though this comparison is not a
full welfare analysis, it suggests that the small-market-only subsidy is likely to be more efficient,
given that the dollar amount paid under these two subsidies is the same.
The result is, however, different when we compare the 10% all-market subsidy to its equiva-
lent small-market-only subsidy: the percentages of business establishments located in monopoly
markets under these two subsidies are, respectively (10.32%, 2.21%, 1.79%, 0.97%) and (11.00%,
2.15%, 1.96%, 1.03%) between 1999 and 2002. The latter is slightly larger (except in year 2000),
implying that the 10% all-market subsidy benefits more business consumers. This change in the
results is not surprising because compared to a 5% all-market subsidy, a 10% all-market subsidy
eliminates more monopoly markets, small or large. When a subsidy is already successful at elim-
inating monopoly markets, restricting it to only small markets can be less efficient. For example,
at the extreme, if a subsidy eliminates all monopoly markets, restricting it to only small markets
may leave some large markets monopolistic. In conclusion, for a large subsidy that can greatly
reduce the number of monopoly markets, switching to a small-market-only subsidy may not be
31 In our sample, 310 of 398 cities fall into this category.
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efficient. In contrast, for a moderate subsidy program, focusing on small markets only may be
more efficient.
 Subsidy to low-cost CLECs only. Another option to improve the effectiveness of a subsidy
policy is to provide a subsidy to only low-cost type potential entrants. Intuitively, a subsidy to a
low-cost potential entrant would be more effective than the same subsidy offered to a high-cost
potential entrant because it would be more likely to help the former to overcome entry costs.
So, a subsidy to only low-cost potential entrants may be more cost effective. This intuition is
illustrated in Rows (6) and (7) of Table 8, where we compare the percentage of monopoly markets
when a 10% subsidy is applied to type-1 (high-cost type) potential entrants only (Row (6)) to
the percentage of monopoly markets when a 10% subsidy is applied to type-2 (low-cost type)
potential entrants only (Row (7)).32 We can see from this comparison that the same amount of
subsidy per firm is more likely to help a low-cost potential entrant to enter than a high-cost
potential entrant. This comparison also shows that the estimated difference between the entry
cost means of the two types (10.082 vs. 9.671) has significant implications for these two types’
entry behavior.
However, at the same time, such a discriminatory policy is applied to fewer potential entrants.
Thus, it is also possible that it encourages less entry. To study the overall effect, we compare
the percentage of monopoly markets when a 10% subsidy is given to all new entrants (Row (3)
in Table 8) to the percentage when an equivalent subsidy is given to low-cost potential entrants
only (Row (8) in Table 8). Again, two subsidy policies are “equivalent” if the total amount of
subsidy paid under the two policies is the same. The comparison of Row (3) and Row (8) shows
that a subsidy to low-cost potential entrants only is less effective than a subsidy to both types.
Unlike the policy that exploits market heterogeneity, a policy exploiting firm heterogeneity is less
effective at reducing the number of monopoly markets than a nondiscriminatory policy.
This result indicates that the latter “fewer firms” effect of the discriminatory policy dominates
the former “entry cost heterogeneity” effect. A subsidy to low-cost firms may be more cost
effective because the same amount of subsidy is more likely to help a low-cost firm to overcome
entry costs than it would a high-cost firm. The magnitude of this effect is governed by the
difference between the entry costs for the two types of firms. Even though the estimated difference
has significant implications for the two types of firms’ entry behavior, as shown by the comparison
of Rows (6) and (7) in Table 8, it is not large enough to dominate the fact that the discriminatory
policy applies to fewer potential entrants, which leads to less entry.
 Subsidy in 1998 only. Last, we study the effect of option values for the arrival speed of
competition in local markets and its implication for the design of entry subsidies. Specifically, we
consider the market structure implications of changing the option value of waiting for potential
entrants by offering a one-shot subsidy in 1998. Thismodification affects the timing of competition
arrival through two channels. First, a potential entrant can receive a subsidy only if entering in
1998, not in subsequent years, which decreases the value of waiting in 1998. The second channel
is through the indirect competition effect. Potential entrants know their competitors will not be
subsidized to enter in years other than in 1998. So, there might be less competition in the future
compared to when the subsidy is offered in all years, which increases the value of entry in 1998.
To illustrate how these two effects would impact the timing of competition arrival, we simulate
the effects of offering a 10% subsidy in 1998 only and present the results in Row (9) of Table 8.
This table shows that the subsidy in 1998 only reduces the share of monopoly markets to 8.72%
by the beginning of 1999, compared to 13.77% when a subsidy is offered in all years (Row (3) in
Table 8). This result suggests that a one-shot subsidy speeds up the arrival of competition and thus
reduces the number of monopoly markets. This is indeed because of the two effects explained
above. Specifically, we find that the average value of waiting (averaged over different values of
32 A similar comparison when a 5% subsidy is used yields qualitatively similar results.
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the state variables) in 1998 for type-1 potential entrants decreases by 42% when we move from
a 10% subsidy offered every year to a 10% subsidy offered in 1998 only. Similarly, we find that
the average value of waiting for type-2 potential entrants decreases by 33%. At the same time,
the average value of entry increases by 0.4%.
To further understand the effects of the above two channels, we conduct two decompositions.
As explained, the overall effect of these two channels is that the percentage of monopoly markets
at the beginning of 1999 drops from 13.77% when a 10% subsidy per entrant is applied in all
years to 8.72% when it is applied in 1998 only. In other words, there is a decline of 5.05%. For
the first decomposition, we keep the value of entry the same as that under the all-year subsidy
while allowing the value of waiting to be that under the 1998-only subsidy. Doing so, we find
that with only the decrease in the value of waiting, the percentage of monopoly markets drops to
11.30%. In other words, of the total decline of 5.05%, 2.47% is due to the decrease in the value
of waiting. The remaining 2.58% of the decline can be attributed to the increase in the value
of entry. In a second decomposition, we keep the value of waiting the same as that under the
all-year subsidy while allowing the value of entry to change. The simulation results show that
the percentage of monopoly markets at the beginning of 1999 decreases from 13.77% to 10.28%.
This decomposition shows that the effect of the increase in the value of entry is 3.49%. Together,
these two decompositions indicate that both channels contribute to a decline in the number of
monopoly markets. They also show that the indirect competition effect through the increase in the
value of entry is slightly higher than the direct effect of reducing the value of waiting. This latter
result suggests that it is important to consider the competition effect of entry when designing a
subsidy policy.
Returning to the comparison of the all-year subsidy policy and the 1998-only subsidy policy,
the long-run effect of the 1998-only subsidy policy may be different from the short-run effect.
For example, under the 1998-only subsidy, the percentage of monopoly markets gradually grows
over time as shown in Row (9) of Table 8. We attribute this result to a high exit rate. Without
continuous subsidies in all years, the industry loses competitive markets later on. In other words,
the long-run effect of this subsidy policy on market structure is influenced by the exit rate. When
the exit rate is high, the long-run effect may be small.
As in previous counterfactuals in which we keep the total amount of subsidy spent the same,
we also apply a 16.7% subsidy in 1998 only, which is equivalent to a 10% subsidy in all years. The
results, presented in Row (10) of Table 8, show that this equivalent 1998-only subsidy drastically
reduces the percentage of monopoly markets, nearly eliminating them by the beginning of 1999.
However, due to the high exit rate, the percentage of monopoly markets at the beginning of 2001
under the equivalent 1998-only subsidy policy becomes higher than that under the 10% subsidy
offered in all years.
8. Conclusion
 Before 1996, decades of regulation left the US local telephone industry with a monopolistic
market structure. The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the telecommunications markets to
new entrants. However, due to substantial entry costs, many local markets remained monopolistic,
leaving deregulated incumbents with the freedom to exercise market power. In this study, we
explore the effect of subsidizing entry costs on new firm entry. We do so by combining economic
theory with data on the entry decisions of CLECs from 1998 to 2002. We estimate a dynamic
oligopolistic entry game, in which potential entrants are heterogeneous long-run players with an
option value of waiting. Through counterfactual experiments, we obtain results that suggest that
policy makers should exploit market heterogeneity but not firm heterogeneity when designing
subsidy policies. Our results also indicate that policy makers should consider the dynamic,
oligopolistic nature of local competition. In particular, we find that subsidies in only early periods
speed up the initial arrival of competition, due to a direct effect that reduces the value ofwaiting and
an indirect competition effect that increases the value of entry. These results shed new light on a
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critical policy area in a fundamental infrastructure industry. Overall, our policy recommendations
exploit information that regulators can readily access (e.g., size of the market) and actions that
regulators can easily control (e.g., timing of the subsidy).
In this study, we focus specifically on the local telephone market. The issues about
encouraging competitive entry are common in many telecommunications industries, especially
the wireless telephone and Internet industries. Moreover, local telephone companies have now
become major players in the Internet market.33 CLEC entry thus brings competition to local
telephone market services and Internet services. Our findings in the local telephone markets
are therefore likely to have implications for policy design in these related telecommunications
markets, where competitive entry can alleviate the discrepancies in the availability and quality
of services across different markets.
Several limitations of our work need to be acknowledged. First, we capture firm-level
heterogeneity in entry costs by allowing firms to draw entry costs from two different distributions.
If we had a longer panel, and in turn more data points, we might be able to discretize firms into
more types and thus better capture firm heterogeneity. Second, our model does not incorporate
post entry firm level heterogeneity. In the real world, CLECs may cater to different clienteles and
offer differentiated value-added services. Without data on post entry competition, however, we
are not able to provide insight on this issue. Third, we assume that entry decisions are independent
across markets. This is a standard assumption in the dynamic entry literature, as the state space
would increase substantially otherwise. One may be concerned about the possibility of entry
clustering due to spillover effects.34 Despite these limitations, we find that our model fits the data
reasonably well. We believe that we have made a first step that we hope will encourage future
research in this area.
Appendix
This Appendix provides some details on the estimation procedure.
 Discretization of the state space. We discretize the state space and estimate the transition probabilities directly
from the data. Specifically, we discretize the market size into two bins: small markets (market size ≤ 5000) and large
markets (market size > 5000). We assign the average market size (averaged across all market-years within the same bin)
as the value for a bin. Similarly, we discretize the number of incumbents into three bins using the following cutoffs:
n = 1, n = 2, n ≥ 3; and assign, for the last bin, the average number of incumbents within the bin as the value for the bin.
We also discretize the number of type-1 and type-2 potential entrants into two bins, each using their respective average
across market-years as the cutoffs (16.243 and 12.660, respectively) and again assign the average within each bin as the
bin value. This discretization is fairly coarse. In web Appendix C, we show that our estimates are robust to various finer
discretizations.
 Estimation of the transition probability. After the discretization, we estimate the transition probabilities directly
from the data. The estimate of the unconditional transition probability is given by
Mˆi j =
∑
k∈K (mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i ) 1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
) = (m j , n j , T1 j , T2 j
)}
#K (mi , ni , T1i , T2i )
, (A1)
where K (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ) is the collection of all market-years whose states are (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ), k represents such a
market-year, and k + 1 represents the same market one year later. The cardinality of the set K (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ) is
#K (mi , ni , T1i , T2i ).
The estimate of the transition probability conditional on a type-1 firm entering is given by
Mˆe1i j =
∑
k∈K (mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i ) e1(k)1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
) = (m j , n j , T1 j , T2 j
)}
∑
k∈K (mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i ) e1(k)
, (A2)
33 The three main types of Internet service providers are ILECs, CLECs, and cable TV companies. As of December
2003, ILECs and CLECs together account for about one third of the high-speed Internet lines in the United States (Xiao
and Orazem, 2011).
34 In web Appendix D, we estimate a model allowing the entry cost to depend on whether a firm is already operating
in a close-by market but still treat entry into different markets as independent. We find that a firm with neighboring
presence does have a slightly lower entry cost on average, but the estimates of other parameters stay fairly robust.
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where e1(k) is the number of type-1 entrants in market-year k. Note that the transition of the states is weighted by the
ratio of the probability that (e1 − 1) out of T1 − 1 potential entrants enter over the probability that e1 out of T1 potential
entrants enter. Similarly,
Mˆe2i j =
∑
k∈K (mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i ) e2(k)1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
) = (m j , n j , T1 j , T2 j
)}
∑
k∈K (mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i ) e2(k)
. (A3)
The same argument gives the estimate of the transition probability conditional on waiting. The transition of the
states conditional on waiting for type-1 firms is weighted by the ratio of the probability that e1 out of T1 − 1 potential
entrants enter over the probability that e1 out of T1 potential entrants enter. The transition for type-2 firms is analogously
weighted. In other words, the estimates are
Mˆw1i j =
∑
k∈K (mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i )
(
T1i − e1(k)
)
1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
) = (m j , n j , T1 j , T2 j
)}
∑
k∈K (mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i )
(
T1i − e1(k)
) , (A4)
and
Mˆw2i j =
∑
k∈K (mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i )
(
T2i − e2(k)
)
1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
) = (m j , n j , T1 j , T2 j
)}
∑
k∈K (mi ,ni ,T1i ,T2i )
(
T2i − e2(k)
) . (A5)
 Computing the Markov perfect equilibrium. We compute the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) to show the
fit of the model and to perform counterfactual simulations. As explained in Section 4, a MPE is a triple (pe, V I , V E )
that solves equations (3), (4), and (5). Therefore, to compute the MPE, we start with a policy function, pe0, which is a
vector with each element representing the probability of entry in a state. We then compute the three transition probability
matrices (the unconditional transition probability of the state, the transition probability conditional on entering, and that
conditional on waiting) corresponding to this policy function. With these transition probability matrices computed, we
compute the fixed point (denoted by V I0 ) of equation (3). We plug V
I
0 into equation (4) and solve for V
E from equation
(4) (denoted by V E0 ). We compute a new policy function (p
e
1) according to equation (5) by plugging in V
I
0 and V
E
0 . We
continue this process until the vector pe converges. We “rule out” multiple equilibria by starting with different initial
guesses of the policy function.
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